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Abstract 
To the extent that circular labour migration in Southeast Asia is increasingly dominated by 
migrants concentrated amongst the low-wage/-skilled occupational sectors, it may be 
observed that migration and precarious work are mutually constitutive in significant ways. 
Inasmuch as migration is frequently espoused as an effective developmental strategy for 
securing pathways to socioeconomic mobility, less is known about the specific conditions 
and practices that enable and/or constrain these possibilities. Furthermore, since migrants 
undertake significant investments (often by means of debt and collateral loans) to finance 
their migration, the risks and consequences of failed migration are far-reaching.  
 
Taking the case-study of Bangladeshi men migrating to Singapore as low-wage construction 
workers, this paper draws on findings from a quantitative survey (n=205) and in-depth 
interviews (n=30) to examine the different processes and practices that mediate men's 
migration experiences and outcomes, as well as how they view and negotiate issues of debt 
and risk in their individual migration trajectores. By analysing both ends of the migration 
stream – i.e. taking into account pre-departure decision-making, conditions of training and 
recruitment, as well as workers' employment experiences at destination – it sheds light on 
the specific conditions of precarity that underpin migration and construction work, whilst 
emphasising men's livelihood strategies in negotiating pathways to upward mobility within 
this context. The evidence gathered will provide a firm basis for policy and advocacy work to 
formulate interventions for increasing the developmental outcomes of migration for 
construction work.  
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Executive Summary 
Migration for construction work is increasingly prevalent, especially amongst low-income 
and low-skilled migrants from rural areas. It is arguably one of the most precarious forms of 
labour, owing to high risks of accidents, flexible labour market policies, and the prevalence 
of outsourcing in the industry. Through a case-study of Bangladeshi migrant men working in 
Singapore’s construction industry, this paper examines the different conditions of precarity 
that underpin men’s migration for work in the construction sector. The findings are based 
on a quantitative survey (n=205) and qualitative in-depth interviews (n=30). Specifically, we 
scrutinise the ‘middle space’ between source and destination by analysing conditions of 
training and recruitment at source, and workers’ employment experiences in Singapore, to 
identify areas of risk and vulnerability that impact the outcomes of men's migration 
experiences.  
 
We found that conditions of pre-departure training and recruitment have served largely to 
intensify migrants' vulnerability to precarious work situations. The costs of migration have 
risen substantially over the years as a result of a growing migration industry that has 
developed in tandem with policy changes in Singapore to train and screen workers at source 
through accredited overseas testing centres. Almost all our respondents (97.1 per cent) had 
to pay money to an agent or training centre in Bangladesh to access skills training, testing, 
and job placement services. The average sum paid was BDT 393,275 (SGD 6,394/USD 4,987), 
and 80.5 per cent borrowed money from different sources to finance these fees. These 
loans consisted of over 65.7 per cent of men’s total placement fees, and those who fully 
repaid their loans reported taking on average 16.5 months to do so. 
 
Despite paying the largest amounts of placement fees compared with workers of other 
nationalities, Bangladeshi migrants tend to occupy the lowest rungs of the wage ladder in 
the construction sector. Survey results reveal that the majority (57.2 per cent) earned a 
basic wage of SGD 20 (USD 14) or less per day. Only 20.5 per cent reported receiving annual 
salary increments, and most respondents (59.3 per cent) within this sub-sample were 
employed in main contracting firms. The prevalence of migrant indebtedness tended to 
exacerbate workers’ unequal bargaining power in the workplace, since their work visas are 
tied to a single employer who has the ability to terminate these contracts at any time 
without penalty. As a result, workers sometimes chose to endure unsafe and/or exploitative 
working conditions rather than risk the possibility of repatriation, especially newly arrived 
migrants.    
 
Notwithstanding the hefty costs and risks involved, Bangladeshi migrants and their families 
continue to utilise labour migration as a strategy for income generation to improve 
standards of living and gain socioeconomic mobility. The majority planned to work for at 
least five to ten years in Singapore, and men’s top three reasons for migration were: paying 
for basic needs (47.8 per cent); accruing savings (15.6 per cent); and starting a business 
(13.2 per cent). Our findings showed that migrants tended to overestimate the amounts 
they were able to remit. The median amount forecasted was SGD 800 (USD 624) per month, 
whereas the actual figure was SGD 600 (USD 468) – a shortfall of 25 per cent. Patterns of 
remittance use also revealed that debt repayment formed the most significant portion of 
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unplanned use, which differed substantially: accounting for 2 per cent in migrants’ plans but 
taking up 22.4 per cent in actuality.  
 
In the face of precarious work in the construction industry, the majority of migrants (59 per 
cent) still felt that daily life for their families back home was either ‘easier’ or ‘much easier’. 
Specifically, remittances were used for everyday household expenses, children’s education, 
and purchasing land or a new house. At the same time, close to half of the respondents 
shared that they have not managed to achieve many of the initial goals they had, as 
business ventures tended to require savings over a longer period of time in reality. In view 
of the increasingly temporary and flexible nature of migrant construction work, migrants 
had to take considerable risk and demonstrate much resilience to realise their goals. Policy 
interventions aimed at reducing workers’ vulnerability to job insecurity and exploitation are 
particularly important to increase the development outcomes of migration for construction 
work.    
 
1. Introduction 
Whilst the construction industry provides an important source of employment globally, 
particularly amongst low-income and low-skilled migrants from rural areas, it is arguably 
one of the most precarious forms of work. Apart from its poor image as being 'dirty, 
dangerous, and difficult', flexible labour market policies and the prevalence of outsourcing 
in the industry have made construction work increasingly temporary and insecure (ILO 
2001). Precarious work refers to ‘paid work characterised by limited social benefits and 
statutory entitlements, job insecurity, low wages, and high risks of ill health’ (Vosko 2006: 4), 
and where employees are made to bear the risks of work as opposed to businesses or the 
state (Kalleberg and Hewison 2012). In the context of contract labour migration in Asia, 
these risks are further accentuated as migrants typically undertake significant investments 
(often by means of debt and collateral loans) to secure overseas jobs in the construction 
sector, where entry is regulated by restrictive visa regimes and networks of brokers that 
provide services in the form of pre-departure training and recruitment (Lian and Rahman 
2006; Lindquist, Xiang and Yeoh 2012). As a result, precarity extends beyond the realm of 
work to include migrant indebtedness and stringent regulations that tend to limit migrants' 
access to social services whilst reinforcing conditions of temporariness and job immobility. 
Despite the hefty costs and risks involved, migrants and their families continue to utilise 
labour migration as a means to sustain and increase livelihood options back home 
(Attanapola 2013). 
 
Drawing on a case-study of Bangladeshi construction workers in Singapore, this paper 
examines the conditions of precarity that underpin men’s migration for work in the 
construction industry. To do so, we scrutinise both ends of the migration stream – what 
happens during the pre-departure process (e.g. migration decision-making, training, and 
recruitment), and the course of a migrant worker’s stay in Singapore (e.g. employment 
relations, workplace safety, and access to social protection) – to understand specific areas of 
risk and vulnerability that have significant bearings on shaping the overall trajectory of an 
individual's migration experience. Whilst the scholarship on migration and precarious work 
has thus far been focused on the differential impacts of neoliberal border regimes and 
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labour market inequalities on low-waged migrant workers (see for example, Anderson 2010; 
May et al. 2009; McDowell, Batnitzky and Dyer 2009), we extend our analysis to incorporate 
migrants' pre-departure experiences as a way of understanding the extent to which 
conditions of recruitment and entry into destination areas may also serve to intensify their 
vulnerability to insecure and/or exploitative employment conditions. In addition to 
examining structural factors such as migration policies and industry hiring and workplace 
practices, we take into account migrants' agency to consider how they view and negotiate 
issues of debt and risk through decision-making practices such as job placement strategies 
and remittance-sending.  
 
2. Migration and Construction Work in Singapore 
2.1 Bangladeshi Migrant Workers  
Demographic trends in post-independence Singapore reveal an increasing proportion of 
non-citizen workers in its total population, especially over the course of the past two 
decades. The country’s heavy reliance on foreign labour is evident in how more than one-
third of its total workforce consists of non-citizen workers, the bulk of whom are low-waged 
transient workers employed in the construction, marine, manufacturing, and paid domestic 
sectors (MOM 2014b). The construction industry currently receives the largest in-flow of 
foreign labour where 65.6 per cent (or 319,100 out of 486,200) of employees are non-citizen 
workers. Although the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) in Singapore does not provide an 
official breakdown of nationalities in its foreign workforce, the High Commission of 
Bangladesh (2014) estimates that there are more than 100,000 Bangladeshi nationals in 
Singapore, with over 90 per cent working in the construction and shipyard industries. 
According to official statistics released by Bangladesh's Bureau of Manpower, Employment 
and Training (BMET 2014), the number of Bangladeshi migrants recruited for work in 
Singapore has risen steadily over the years in tandem with periods of construction boom, 
such as from the mid-1990s and also from 2005 onwards, when major infrastructure works 
were slated for development (see Figure 1). In 2013, a total of 60,057 Bangladeshi workers 
were deployed within a single year – an unprecedented number so far. In the same year, 
Singapore was also the second highest recipient country for Bangladeshi migrants after 
Oman (BMET 2014).      
 
In conjunction with the steady increase of Bangladeshi arrivals, remittances from Singapore 
more than doubled between 2006 and 2010, rising from USD 80.24 million to USD 202.32 
million within a short span of four years (High Commission of Bangladesh 2014). Inasmuch 
as overseas migrants have been extolled as ‘playing an important role in [Bangladesh’s] 
national development’ (High Commission of Bangladesh 2014), labour market inequalities 
(segmented along the lines of gender, race, class, and nationality) reveal the marginalised 
position that Bangladeshi workers tend to occupy in Singapore's labour force. In the 
construction sector, Bangladeshi migrants are predominantly recruited as basic-skilled 
workers that occupy the bottom rungs of the wage scale, whereas semi-skilled Thai and PRC 
Chinese workers, and skilled Malaysian workers tend to command significantly higher wages 
(Kitiarsa 2006; Wong 1997). It was highlighted in a news report that whilst PRC Chinese 
construction workers earned an average monthly salary of over SGD 1,000 (USD 780), 
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Bangladeshi workers are typically only paid between SGD 480 (USD 374) and SGD 800 (USD 
624) (The Straits Times, January 5, 2013). This hierarchy of wage differentials affirms what 
Aguilar (2003: 148) refers to as the ‘racist strategies of capital’ that exploits regional socio-
economic disparities through class-based determinants that intersect broadly with national 
stereotypes. 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Bangladeshi Workers in Singapore (New Hires)* 
 
* Figures are derived from the number of overseas workers who have obtained clearance at the Bureau of 
Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET) in Bangladesh. In-flow returnees are not included. 
Source: Unpublished statistics from BMET, available at http://bmet.gov.bd (accessed September 22, 2014). 
 
Despite their growing numbers in Singapore, little has been documented concerning the 
migration and employment experiences of Bangladeshi workers, with the exception of a few 
studies (see for example Abdullah 2005; Rahman 2009; TWC2 2012; Ye 2013). These studies 
have addressed issues that include: migrant indebtedness stemming from excessive 
intermediary fees (Rahman 2013; TWC2 2012); the role of social networks in facilitating 
migration decision-making (Rahman 2009); subjectivities of class and masculinity amongst 
Bangladeshi male migrants (Ye 2013); and disciplinary practices in the construction site as a 
‘total institution’ where daily activities are heavily regimented to ‘realise the discursive ideal 
of the “good docile worker”’ (Abdullah 2005: 228). Much less research has been done on the 
development impacts of migration for construction work on migrants and their families, 
including mediating factors that enable and/or impinge upon these aspirational mobilities. 
Another lacuna lies in migrants’ own understandings of debt and risk, and how precarity is 
negotiated on an everyday level when dealing with processes of training, recruitment, and 
employment. To understand these issues, it is important to first establish the policy context 
within which low-waged migrant workers are situated in Singapore.  
2.2 Singapore’s Managed Migration Regime 
Aligned with its efforts to promote Singapore as a global city and ‘Talent Capital’, the state 
has instituted a complex and stratified migration regime, which differentiates between 
highly skilled elite professionals (under the ‘Employment Pass’ category), mid-skilled 
workers (‘S Pass’), and low-waged contract workers (also known as ‘Work Permit’ holders). 
Whilst workers on Employment and S Passes are eligible to bring their spouses and children, 
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work permit holders (WPHs) are required to leave their families behind to enter the country 
as individual workers with little or no opportunity for formal citizenship. Tied at the lowest 
rungs of the wage spectrum. WPHs are subjected to a host of stringent policy and bio-
policing measures designed to facilitate the cheap extraction of their labour, which ensure 
that they remain a transient (and disposable) workforce who can be repatriated in periods 
of economic downturn (Yeoh 2006). Job mobility is also restricted for WPHs as they are not 
permitted to seek a change of employer, apart from those employed in the construction 
industry, where written consent of one's current employer is required to process the 
request. By virtue of their visa status, WPHs are prohibited from marrying Singapore citizens 
or permanent residents without prior consent of the state. It is also stated in legislation that 
WPHs ‘shall not be involved in any illegal, immoral or undesirable activities, including 
breaking up families in Singapore’ (MOM 2012a), which marks them as potential 
transgressors of the country’s social order.  
 
The state regulates the inflow of low-waged migrant workers in three primary ways: (1) the 
work permit system; (2) a tiered levy system; and (3) variable dependency ceilings that 
prescribe the proportion of migrant workers permissible in each occupational sector. Under 
the work permit system, workers are issued with one or two-year contracts that are tied to 
a specific employer and occupational sector, which are subjected to renewal on a regular 
basis. MOM currently imposes maximum periods of employment for basic skilled (R2) and 
higher skilled (R1) WPHs from ‘Non-Traditional Source’ (NTS) countries (i.e. India, 
Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand and Sri Lanka) and China – of 10 and 22 years 
respectively – which are ‘designed as an administrative control to ensure that [these 
workers] remain transient and do not sink roots in Singapore’ (MOM 2012a). To be qualified 
under the higher skilled category (R1), workers need to be registered with the Construction 
Registration of Tradesmen (CoreTrade) or Multi-Skilling scheme, and issued with trade 
certifications recognised by Singapore’s Building and Construction Authority (BCA), in 
addition to having at least four years of construction experience in Singapore. On the other 
hand, workers employed under the basic skilled category (R2) must possess either a Skills 
Evaluation Certificate (SEC) or a Skills Evaluation Certificate (Knowledge) issued by BCA, 
typically at a designated overseas testing centre (OTC).   
 
To raise productivity in the construction sector, the Ministry has also stipulated a tiered levy 
system to incentivise employers to hire higher skilled workers. The monthly levy rate for 
higher skilled WPHs (under R1) is SGD 300 (USD 234), whilst the rate for R2 WPHs is SGD 550 
(USD 429). Over the next two years, the differential levy rate is set to increase from SGD 250 
(USD 195) to SGD 400 (USD 312) (The Straits Times, October 31, 2014). Construction 
companies are subject to Man-Year Entitlements (MYEs) when employing workers from NTS 
countries and China. Based on the value of projects or contracts awarded by developers, 
main contractors are allocated a number of ‘man-years’ required to complete the project 
and a corresponding number of foreign workers they are entitled to employ. When an 
employer hires a worker beyond his allocated MYEs, the levy rate is further increased to 
SGD 700 (USD 546) and SGD 950 (USD 741) for R1 and R2 WPHs respectively. The 
construction sector has one of the highest dependency ceilings, which is presently one local 
full-time worker to seven foreign workers (MOM 2014a). Between 2006 and 2009, the 
dependency ratio doubled from 1:4 to 1:8 within a short span of three years, which 
corresponds to the sharp spike in numbers of Bangladeshi workers arriving in Singapore 
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when construction demand rose from USD 12 billion to USD 21 billion (Baey 2010; Rahman 
2006; see Figure 1). 
2.3 Subcontracting and Labour Market Flexibility 
Although it is acknowledged that low-waged migrant workers provide a crucial source of 
labour essential for the infrastructural growth of modern Singapore, it is evident from policy 
that a distinct sort of labouring body is produced and demanded in the construction sector –  
one that is low-cost, hyper-productive, docile, and disposable. The flexible nature of work is 
seen in how the MYE system allocates time-specific contracts to employers on a project-to-
project basis for the hiring of migrant workers. Due to the prevalence of subcontracting in 
the industry, it is not uncommon for main contractors to allocate or sell their MYEs to 
subcontractors that provide both labour and specialised services (such as piling, scaffolding, 
metal casting, and electrical engineering) for particular sections of a project. It has been 
argued that construction companies utilise labour subcontracting as a ‘labour-market 
strategy’ (Debrah and Ofori 1997: 690) to maintain flexibility and cope with uncertainties in 
demand. Its strategic importance lies in the availability of ‘a “floating” pool of skilled and 
unskilled site labour from which required numbers of tradespersons and labourers are 
engaged from project to project, and, sometimes from week to week [… whilst relieving] the 
main contractor of contractual obligations to the workforce: (ibid: 697). In this regard, risks 
and uncertainty in the labour market are systematically passed down to workers who are 
reliant upon a continuous flow of short-term, contractual work to ensure income stability.    
 
At the sending end of the migration stream, migrants often undertake substantial loans to 
finance their migration journeys, whilst having to invest time and effort to undergo 
mandatory skills training to be eligible for a work permit in Singapore (Rahman 2009, 2013; 
TWC2 2012). Past research has shown that Bangladeshi workers pay an average placement 
fee of SGD 7,256 (USD 5,660) to secure a job in Singapore's construction industry – a figure 
which includes training costs (workers must be formally certified in a construction trade 
prior to their departure), and intermediary fees for job placement services (TWC2 2012). As 
will be elaborated in subsequent sections of the paper, the commercial nature of brokering 
practices in Bangladesh have fuelled exorbitant agent fees charged to migrants (even before 
a job is secured), which have largely exacerbated conditions of precarity for individuals and 
their families. Consequently, economic precarity takes on a transnational quality, and is 
further compounded by various forms of vulnerability including: issues of non-citizenship 
(i.e. limited access to social protection and statutory entitlements); job uncertainty (due to 
work permit conditions and the prevalence of subcontracting in the industry); social 
exclusion; and different occupational hazards tied to the ‘3D’ (meaning: dirty, dangerous, 
and difficult) nature of construction work (e.g. workplace injuries stemming from falls and 
the use of dangerous equipment).  
 
3. Field Methods 
The study adopted a mixed-methods approach combining both quantitative and qualitative 
methods through the use of bilingual questionnaires (n=205) and semi-structured interviews 
(n=30). Between January and May 2014, the quantitative survey was conducted at 11 key 
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sites spread across Singapore. We worked to ensure that our sampling sites were 
geographically diverse, whilst taking into account areas where many migrant worker 
dormitories were located. Sampling sites included areas where Bangladeshi migrant workers 
tended to congregate on weekends (i.e. Farrer Park MRT station [within the Little India 
enclave], and Boon Lay MRT station), migrant worker dormitories, a restaurant along Rowell 
Road in Little India where TWC2's free meal programme runs ,1 a safety training school for 
construction workers, as well as areas that were close to major construction sites.  
 
Survey respondents were recruited through a sampling strategy that utilised a mix of 
stratified and snowball sampling techniques, whilst taking into account the following 
variables: 
 Type of visa (i.e. Work Permit, S Pass, or Special Pass holder)2 
 Marital status (and number of dependents) 
 Type of employer (i.e. labour supply company, subcontracting firm, or main 
contractor)  
 
Whilst the survey component helped identify important trends and issues concerning the 
processes and outcomes of migration amongst Bangladeshi construction workers in 
Singapore, these were explored and analysed more intensively through qualitative 
investigation. Between April and July 2014, follow-up interviews were conducted amongst a 
sub-sample of 30 respondents. Potential interviewees were identified through the survey 
database with reference to the following variables: type of visa; marital status; type of 
employer; amount of placement fees; year of first arrival; and perception of family life after 
migration. Interviews were conducted at two key sites where workers typically congregate 
on Sundays: Farrer Park MRT and Boon Lay MRT. The team usually worked in pairs, with one 
person leading the conversation and another taking field notes. Each interview lasted 
approximately between 1 hour and 1 hour 30 minutes. 
3.1 Overview of Sample 
In our overall sample of 205 respondents, 149 were Work Permit holders (72.7 per cent), 52 
held Special Passes (25.4 per cent), and 4 were on S Passes (2 per cent; see Figure 2).3 The 
majority of workers were employed by subcontracting firms (56.1 per cent), whilst 30.2 per 
cent worked for a main contractor, and 13.7 per cent with ‘labour-only’ subcontractors (also 
known as labour supply companies).4 43.4 per cent of workers were on their first overseas 
                                                            
1 TWC2 is a local NGO dedicated to assisting low-wage migrant workers (employed mainly in construction, 
shipyard, sanitation services, manufacturing, and domestic work) in difficulty, through direct services, research, 
and advocacy work. More information about the organisation can be found at their website: www.twc2.org.sg 
2 Special passes are issued by the Ministry of Manpower to foreign workers who are undergoing 
salary/employment disputes and/or medical treatment stemming from workplace injuries. These processes 
allow workers to stay legally in Singapore whilst their cases are being processed and investigated by the 
Ministry. The majority of them are not allowed to work, except for those who have applied to be on the 
Temporary Job Scheme (TJS). 
3 These percentages do not correspond to actual proportions within the migrant worker population in 
Singapore, where the numbers of Special Pass holders are much smaller. The decision to recruit more Special 
Pass holders stemmed from the need to have a sizable population within the sample for data comparison with 
respondents on other visa passes, seeing that the focus of our study was on issues of debt and precarity.   
4 ‘Labour-only’ subcontractors are companies that specialise in the temporary employment (or deployment) of 
general workers or tradesmen for particular sections of a construction project (Debrah and Ofori 1997).  
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migration stint (i.e. working with their first employer), whilst 56.6 per cent had either 
worked for at least two employers in Singapore, or had prior overseas work experience in 
other countries. Amongst the former, the majority (22.4 per cent) were students before 
migrating to Singapore. Others were either unemployed or working in small businesses, 
farms, or the services sector.   
 
  
  
Figure 2: Type of Visa (n=205)  Figure 3: Type of Employer (n=205) 
 
All our respondents were male, as only male migrants of particular nationalities may be 
recruited as foreign construction workers in Singapore. Although there was a wide variation 
in age amongst respondents, the bulk (35.1 per cent) of workers were aged between 26 and 
30 years (see Figure 4); 59 per cent of the sample were currently single; and 41 per cent 
were married. Amongst those who were married, 31.2 per cent had at least one child. The 
majority were also relatively well educated, with 84.4 per cent possessing at least secondary 
school qualifications, amongst which 46.3 per cent had higher secondary school 
qualifications, and 7.8 per cent were tertiary educated (see Figure 5). Compared with 
national averages in Bangladesh, it is clear that workers are predominantly from the middle-
class stratum of society. 60.5 per cent of workers reported that they were the main financial 
supporter of their families, and the average household size in Bangladesh amongst our 
respondents was 5.5.    
  
  
Figure 4: Age (n=205)     Figure 5: Highest Level of Education (n=205) 
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4. Precarious Livelihoods and Debt-financed Migration 
4.1 Decision-making and Livelihood Strategies 
Amongst men’s narratives of their decision-making process, migration was utilised primarily 
as a spatial and temporal strategy for income generation to ensure daily household 
reproduction, and accrue savings and capital to build better livelihoods for the future. As 
seen in Figure 6, the top three reasons for migration were: (1) to pay for basic needs (47.8 
per cent);5 (2) to accrue savings (15.6 per cent); and (3) to start a business (13.2 per cent). 
Other reasons included ‘parents’ well-being’, ‘income stability for the future’, ‘career 
aspirations’, and ‘getting a job’. In a survey question that asked how migrants first found out 
about working in Singapore, the majority (72.2 per cent) replied that it was through a 
friend’s or family member’s recommendation, and most often from those who have worked 
or are currently working in Singapore. 15.6 per cent of respondents went directly to the 
training centre, 4.4 per cent were approached by an agent, and others heard about job 
opportunities in Singapore through advertisements in the local newspaper. The bulk of 
migrants (52.7 per cent) reported that they made the decision to work in Singapore on their 
own, whilst 35.6 per cent said that this was undertaken as a joint family decision.   
 
 
 
Figure 6: Top Reason for Migration (n=205) 
 
Based on the interviews, the main push factor that led many to explore overseas job 
opportunities was a perceived lack of viable employment for improved standards of living in 
Bangladesh. Sumon (aged 38, Work Permit Holder) chose to leave his job at his father’s 
business because he saw migration as being able to ‘change my fate’ (WP003-081, p.1). 
Being the main financial supporter of seven household members, he felt that the business 
‘was not profitable enough for my own livelihood and maintaining my own family’ and that 
                                                            
5 It is worth making the point that the term ‘basic needs’ carries different connotations for different classes of 
migrants. As previously mentioned, workers in the sample are predominantly from middle-class backgrounds 
in Bangladesh, and are certainly not the poorest of the poor. When we posed the question to respondents in 
the survey, most understood the term to mean everyday family expenses such as food, household items, and 
clothing. Whilst some workers remitted out of financial necessity, there were others who contributed to daily 
household expenses more so as an act of filial piety. It was common for those in the latter group to have 
siblings working overseas in the Middle East or elsewhere who remitted regularly as well.     
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whilst he ‘could pass days with that little sum of earnings’, ‘it wasn’t a perfect earning 
source to change my lifestyle [and] my fate’ (WP003-081, p.1). His wife had initially mooted 
the idea of migrating to Singapore for work, saying, ‘Go there. Many people have been there. 
Your friend has changed his life, and now it is your turn to change our fate. You will come 
back, and you will have some money’ (WP003-081, p.1). Despite holding a university degree 
in Political Science, he reckoned that ‘getting a job in Bangladesh is very hard’. As he 
explained, ‘If I started a job matching my qualifications, I would get a maximum of BDT 
10,000 (SGD 162/USD 126), which is a very poor price for [my] livelihood. I need more 
money’ (WP003-081, p.3). His plan was to work ten years in Singapore so that he could earn 
money to purchase land, make improvements to the family house, and start a business. At 
present, he earns a basic daily wage of SGD 20 (USD 16) per day, and clocks approximately 
30 hours of overtime weekly. This hectic schedule has enabled him to remit a monthly 
average of SGD 700 (USD 546) to his family back home.    
 
A handful of respondents chose to withdraw from existing college or university programmes, 
as they were not confident of being able to secure good employment upon graduation. 
Shohel (aged 26, Special Pass Holder) shared that even if he were to complete his diploma 
programme, he would have ‘no money and no job’ (SP001-154, p.2). He had spent three 
years job-hunting in the public and private sectors in Bangladesh, but did not manage to find 
a job that would enable him to save for his future. Referring to a job he had turned down, 
he lamented that ‘this money [meaning: salary, will] only pay for makan [a Malay/local term 
for ‘food’] and sleeping. [I don’t] save money for [my] future’ (SP001-154, p.21). Moreover, 
he reckoned that he also needed to fork out a bribe of BDT 400,000 to 500,000 (SGD 6,500 
to SGD 8,130/USD 5,070 to USD 6,341) in order to secure a civil service job in Bangladesh 
because no one in his family had worked in the public sector. He therefore decided that it 
would be best to find a job overseas based on a relative’s recommendation that ‘Singapore 
[is] good, [because you] can earn money, and develop [yourself]’ (SP001-154, p.1). In many 
cases, men’s aspirations took the form of securing higher earnings through overseas work to 
build a new house and save for a business venture upon return. Shohel shared that he 
needed at least SGD 30,000 (USD 23,400) to set up a small business in the local bazaar, and 
over SGD 100,000 (USD 78,000) for a larger business venture – money he would otherwise 
not be able to raise with paltry earnings in Bangladesh.       
4.2 Debt as Strategy or Entrapment? 
Inasmuch as labour migration was seen as a viable pathway to achieving socioeconomic 
mobility, the decision also required significant investments in terms of finance, time, and 
discipline, even before a job is secured. Almost all our respondents (97.1 per cent) had to 
pay money to an agent or training centre in Bangladesh before they left for work in 
Singapore. Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of pre-departure fees that workers paid in 
total for their first migration stint to Singapore, where the average sum was BDT 393,275 
(SGD 6,394/USD 4,987). The majority of respondents (80.5 per cent) had to borrow money 
from a range of sources to finance these fees, and the main sources of lending were 
primarily from relatives (45.4 per cent), followed by household members (9.8 per cent), and 
the bank (9.8 per cent). Even amongst those who did not have to borrow, the interviews 
revealed that many either sold land or gold to obtain the necessary capital. When asked 
whether or not they were aware of these costs when they first made the decision to migrate, 
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the bulk of workers replied that they were, although some cited instances where agent fees 
were arbitrarily raised during the course of pre-departure training. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Total Amount of Placement Fees in BDT (n=205) 
 
For many respondents, debt was considered both a strategy and enabling factor to secure 
one’s livelihood for the future through migration. According to Kalam (aged 43, Special Pass 
Holder), migrant men undertake the decision to migrate by weighing these initial costs 
against the longer-term benefits of obtaining higher income levels from overseas work in 
Singapore. As he explained:  
 
The broker [will] say, [if] you go Singapore, you [will] earn a lot of money. 
Bangla person thinking, ‘[If] I go to Singapore, [I can earn] a lot of money, 
because I can take a loan, then I return.’ […] He will calculate maybe 4 months, 
5 months, 3 months, [after which] I [can] return all the money [I borrowed]. […] 
Because [the agent fee is typically] 4 or 5 lakhs [SGD 6,500 or 8,130/USD 5,070 
or USD 6,341]… [and] he has some money… then [he will borrow] 2 lakhs [SGD 
3,250], 3 lakhs [SGD 4,890/USD 3,814]. Then he arrange… [to sell or mortgage] 
his land, [and] sell many things. He [will] arrange [to borrow] 2 lakhs, 2 lahks 50, 
like this (SP001-117B, p.2).   
 
Similarly, Shohel did not appear distressed when asked whether or not he felt it pressurising 
to take on several loans to finance his migration journey. His father had sold land on his 
behalf, whilst his elder brother working in Malaysia helped to chip in some money as well. 
The family also borrowed from relatives and friends to raise the BDT 500,000 (SGD 
8,130/USD 6,341) needed for his placement fees. The total loan amounted to BDT 400,000 
(SGD 6,500/USD 5,070), which comprised of 80 per cent of his overall placement fees. In 
Shohel’s view, as long as he had a job secured in Singapore, he was positive that ‘all the 
borrowed money also [I] can give [back]’ (SP001-154, p.6).  
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Insofar as debt provided a possibility for migrants who would otherwise not have sufficient 
capital to finance their migration, the sheer sum required often meant that migrants were 
entrapped in a protracted cycle whereby one’s earnings during the initial year (or more) 
were used predominantly for debt repayment purposes. Ensuring a regular flow of income 
during this period becomes crucial, especially when loans are taken out on interest. For 
loans taken from friends or relatives that have no direct interest, migrants frequently 
remain socially obligated to supplement these loans with in-kind payments such as gifts and 
favours (Rahman 2009). In the survey, the average amount of money that workers had to 
borrow was BDT 258,423 (SGD 4,202/USD 3,278) or 65.7 per cent of their average total 
placement fee (see Figure 8). Whilst most respondents (n=154) thought that it would take 
approximately 12 months to repay their loans, close to half (49.8 per cent) reported that 
actual debt repayment took much longer than initially expected. During the time of the 
survey, 44.6 per cent of workers were still struggling to repay their debts, and expected to 
take an average length of 12.4 more months to do so. Amongst respondents who have fully 
repaid their loans, the average length of time taken was 16.5 months. Considering that 
workers are typically issued with one-year work permits, this meant that they often had to 
embark on multiple migration stints to repay these loans. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Amount Borrowed for Placement Fees in BDT (n=161) 
 
As will be elaborated in subsequent sections, the prevalence of migrant indebtedness 
further deepens the power imbalance between employers and employees, as migrants 
would sometimes choose to endure harsh and/or unsafe working conditions rather than risk 
the possibility of early repatriation if they raised particular concerns with their employers. In 
this regard, the spatial and temporal dimensions of precarity are important to consider since 
workers’ rights to residence within the country are tied directly to their work permits under 
a single employer. In cases where workers unwittingly fall out of employment as a result of 
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injury or salary disputes with their employer, the financial burden becomes even greater. At 
present, Shohel still owes SGD 5,000 (USD 3,900) from the money he borrowed for his 
placement fees. Being on Special Pass status has meant that he is not allowed to work, as he 
currently awaits work injury compensation from his employer after injuring his hand from a 
three-storey fall off a zinc roof he was working on. Apart from having to manage 
expectations whenever relatives called to chase for payment, he also had to take on further 
loans from a friend in Singapore to make ends meet during the 13 months that he has been 
on Special Pass. Notwithstanding the physical and emotional strains of coping with injury, 
Shohel's situation illustrates the slippery slope that migrants can find themselves in when 
regular income ceases unexpectedly, especially when they still have outstanding debts to 
repay back home.       
 
5. The Migration Infrastructure 
5.1 Negotiating Gateways in the Migration Industry 
Over the years, the costs of migration have increased substantially for Bangladeshi migrants, 
in large part due to a growing migration industry that has developed in tandem with the 
formalisation of the labour recruitment regime in Singapore. Amongst respondents in our 
survey, workers who arrived in the 1990s paid an average of BDT 173,265 (SGD 4,812/USD 
3,753)6 for job placement fees, whereas the amount paid for those arriving after 2011 was 
BDT 445,499 (SGD 7,243/USD 5,650) – a hefty 39 per cent increase (see Figure 9). In 
significant ways, these increases correspond to policy changes in Singapore, signalling a 
deliberate shift towards hiring skilled labourers in the construction workforce. In February 
2000, the BCA introduced its Skills Evaluation Certificate (K) scheme,7 to facilitate the 
recruitment of migrant workers through skills testing and certification at designated OTCs in 
various source countries.8 Since 2005, it has made it mandatory for all migrants recruited in 
the construction sector to be formally certified under this scheme. The entrant category of 
‘unskilled’ workers under MOM's former work permit scheme was also phased out after July 
2011, and replaced with tiered categories of ‘basic skilled’ and ‘higher skilled’ workers. 
Stemming from these changes, a host of training centres offering skills training for BCA 
certification have sprung up around the capital city of Dhaka and major migrant-sending 
districts in Bangladesh. Established training centres often work closely with BCA-appointed 
OTCs and employers or recruiting agents in Singapore to serve as an integrated portal for 
prospective migrants by providing skills training and testing, job placement, and travel 
arrangement services, whilst smaller centres tend to be reliant upon their larger 
counterparts, especially for obtaining test slots from OTCs.  
 
                                                            
6 Based on the conversion rate in the late 1990s, where 1 SGD = 37 Taka.   
7 The SEC (K) consists of a 1-hour written examination and 4 to 5-hours practical test on a specific skills trade. 
Only those who pass both components of the test are awarded with the SEC (K) certificate (see BCA website; 
https://www.bca.gov.sg/otc/otc_main.html).  
8 There are currently eight OTCs in Bangladesh offering a total of 21 skills qualifications (BCA 2011). 
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Figure 9: Average Total Placement Fee in BDT by Year (n=205) 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the typical recruitment process for first-time migrants, alongside 
different actors involved in the existing migration industry. In the first instance, prospective 
migrants are linked with a local village broker or training centre through the 
recommendation of a friend or relative who has worked overseas in Singapore. The broker 
acts as an intermediary by providing advice and linking migrants with training centres or 
recruiting agents in Dhaka. Since BCA-recognised skills certification is mandatory for 
securing a work permit in Singapore, the training centre often represents the first gateway 
for migrants in the pre-departure process. After paying an initial deposit (usually 10 per cent 
of the total placement fee), students then commence theory and practical lessons on a 
specialised trade skill, such as waterproofing, pipefitting, electrical wiring installation, and 
steel reinforcement.9 These courses typically last between three and four months, after 
which students are scheduled to sit for the SEC (K) skills test. Although test slots are 
available on a monthly basis, these are often very limited since students need to be issued 
with a Prior Approval (PA) form – which employers have to register beforehand with MOM – 
before being eligible to sit for the test. Upon successful completion of the test and being 
issued a skills certificate, workers await receipt of an In-Principle Approval (IPA) letter by 
employers, which serves as a temporary contract for them to gain entry into Singapore. 
Once the IPA is issued, migrants typically pay the bulk of remaining fees to the training 
centre, which ranges from BDT 400,000 to 500,000 (SGD 6,500 to 8,130/ USD 5,070 to USD 
6,341). In view of the sheer costs of migration, it is important to point out that the existing 
migration regimes in Bangladesh and Singapore effectively render migration for 
construction work inaccessible to actual construction workers in Bangladesh, in favour of 
middle-class students who can afford the training (but probably require a much lengthier 
period of training).      
 
                                                            
9 For a full list of trades, see https://www.bca.gov.sg/otc/others/TRADEBangladesh.pdf  
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Figure 10: Recruitment Process for Bangladeshi Migrants in Singapore* 
* Arrows represent exchanges between different actors within the recruitment process, which may involve 
flows of money, people, and/or information. 
 
5.2 Issues of Training and Recruitment 
Although training centres were initially set up to facilitate the recruitment process for 
Singapore-bound workers, the generally unregulated nature of the industry has brought 
about several pitfalls and issues concerning training and recruitment practices in Bangladesh. 
In particular, we found that men's experiences at the training centres were sometimes 
fraught with mismatched expectations and, in some cases, extra financial costs that were 
largely unanticipated. Whilst the integrated nature of a training centre may offer a measure 
of convenience for migrants, it also means that upon enrolment workers are bound into the 
system, especially given existing practices such as the collection of an initial fee and the 
retention of workers' passports. A common issue encountered was the protracted length at 
which workers stayed at the training centre to await for available test slots at the OTC, 
resulting in unforeseen delays and extra costs. On a few occasions, workers reported having 
to stay up to twelve months stemming from a large oversupply of students. According to 
Mizan (aged 23, Special Pass Holder), out of 500 trained students who wished to find work 
in Singapore, only 50 test slots were available each month for them to compete for. He 
found the training centre experience mentally pressurising, sharing that ‘some people [will] 
stay nine months or one year [… and] then he stop, [and] he surrender’ (SP001-163, p.13).  
 
Sumon likened the harsh training conditions to ‘kill[ing] the personality of a man’ (WP003-
081, p.3), and shared that ‘they hit students with sticks, but they didn’t do this with me 
because I was older, and… I am educated [with a university degree]’ (WP003-081, p.4). 
Others rationalised the tough training as a means for agents to weed out bad workers. 
Zabed (aged 28, Special Pass Holder) shared that ‘if you can work after enduring that 
challenge, then they think you'll also be able to work in Singapore. They want a person who 
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can work hard. A person who can't work hard – what will be the use of them in Singapore?’ 
(SP003-174, p.15) Apart from the heavy physical demands of training, two respondents 
reported that their placement fees were arbitrarily raised with the alleged reason that ‘the 
[Singapore] dollar value has increased’ (SP003-173, p.8). For Kamal (aged 26, Work Permit 
Holder), the increase was more than 37 per cent of what he was initially told:  
 
When I first went to the training centre, I had a contract for BDT 250,000 (SGD 
4,065/USD 3,170) [but] there were a lot of people in the training centre, and so 
it took me six months to finish the training. Then after six months, they said BDT 
250,000 (SGD 4,065/USD 3,170) is not enough, we need BDT 400,000 (SGD 
6,504/USD 5,073) [… because] the price of the Singapore dollar went up. This 
price went up, and so you have to pay BDT 400,000 (SGD 6,504/USD 5,073). I 
thought okay, I did the training for six months and I passed [the examination]. 
Whatever money it takes, I eventually have to go to Singapore. I went through 
the hard work, I paid some money, so what's the point of sitting down? As I have 
done it, it is better that I go. If I go to Singapore, [then] I can earn money 
(WP001-056, p.4). 
 
Kamal’s experience highlights the vulnerabilities that first-time migrants face by virtue of 
having to go through the 'official' route of a training centre to access skills certification for 
obtaining a work permit in Singapore. Once workers are formally certified, however, they 
tend to pay a smaller fee for job placement services on subsequent migration stints. Kamal 
was determined to cross this initial hurdle regardless of the extra costs, as it seemed a 
greater loss for him to forfeit the opportunity of work in Singapore, having invested a 
substantial amount of time, money, and energy to complete his training. He did not 
negotiate the extra fees, and shared instead that he was just ‘focused on paying the money 
and going to Singapore’ (WP001-056, p.4). As he explained, ‘Even if I don’t go now, I will go 
after two months... Because the guy from whom I heard about Singapore, this guy was 
working in a good company. So if I can get into a good company, I can earn these money and 
get a better life’ (WP001-056, p.5).    
 
 
  
Photographs by Grace Baey 
 
Figure 11: Prospective migrants at a training centre in Dhaka, Bangladesh 
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The importance of securing a good company was frequently emphasised by workers, since 
the work permit system in Singapore operates on a sponsorship basis where visas are tied to 
one's employer on one or two-year contract terms. However, workers shared that it was not 
common practice for agents at the training centre to provide much information about the 
company that they were placed in. According to Zabed, ‘They only say that they will give [us 
a] good company. Only this. What is good or bad, we were not able to understand it. [The 
agent collects the] same amount from all. What is allocated depends on fate [and] they send 
to those companies from which they get the visa’ (SP003-174, p.12). In Sumon's case, he 
was convinced by a friend ‘that these agents don’t care what people do here [in Singapore]. 
They just give them training, a visa, and send them here’ (WP003-081, p.6). Subsequently, 
he enlisted the help of a friend in Singapore to source for a separate agent who could match 
him with a good employer. These agents are typically fellow Bangladeshi migrants who have 
worked in Singapore for a substantial time period and are senior employees in their 
respective companies. When specific job openings are made available, these men would 
often work with their employers to hire new workers from Bangladesh based on their 
networks.   
 
To increase their chances of being placed in a good company, Bangladeshi migrants often 
tap into social networks in Singapore to enquire about specific companies upon receiving 
their IPA letters. At times, workers like Sumon would even choose to pay extra money to 
retrieve their passports from the training centre to engage a separate agent to source for a 
good employer (see Figure 10). Good employers were generally perceived as those that 
offered a basic salary of over SGD 20 (USD 16) per day, adhered to proper safety procedures, 
and provided adequate rest for their employees. Amongst the different types of companies 
in the construction industry, main contractors were the most highly sought after, followed 
by subcontractors, and labour supply companies respectively. Whilst sourcing for a good 
employer through agents and personal contacts might serve to increase the possibility of 
being matched with a desired company, this route was not without extra costs and did not 
always guarantee positive results. Mehedi's (aged 18, Work Permit Holder) rejected several 
job offers through the training centre, having heard from his brother in Singapore that these 
were not good companies. Through a cousin's recommendation, he eventually took the 
gamble to pay an additional SGD 3,100 (USD 2,418) to engage another agent to source for 
an employer, only to realise upon arrival in Singapore that he was matched with a labour 
supply company where workers were frequently overworked and not provided with 
sufficient rest. 
 
6. Precarious Employment in the Construction Industry 
By virtue of specific conditions of entry and recruitment outlined in previous sections, it is 
clear how the state's instrumentalist migration regime and the profit-driven nature of the 
migration industry plays a significant role in producing and reinforcing conditions of 
precarity for low-waged migrants. These circumstances are important to take into account, 
especially when examining aspects of precarious employment in the construction industry 
where migrant indebtedness and workers' marginalised socio-legal status may work to 
increase their susceptibility to abuse and/or exploitation (Lewis et al. 2014). In this section, 
we examine key contributing factors to different forms of risk and vulnerability for 
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Bangladeshi workers, namely: low wages; job insecurity; workers' unequal bargaining power 
and lack of access to the labour market; and lapses in workplace safety enforcement.    
6.1 Wage Issues 
Despite having to pay the largest amounts of pre-departure fees compared with workers of 
other nationalities, Bangladeshi migrant workers tend to occupy the lowest rungs of the 
wage ladder in the construction sector (The Straits Times, February 2, 2014) 10. Furthermore, 
even though workers’ recruitment and placement fees have increased sharply over the 
years, wage levels have largely stagnated. It was reported in Martin’s (1991) review of 
labour migration trends in Asia that wages in the construction industry fell from an average 
of SGD 23 (USD 18) to SGD 16 (USD 12.5) per day during the late 1980s when the 
government raised the foreign worker levy rate to reduce employers’ reliance on unskilled 
workers. As illustrated in Figure 12, survey results reveal that the majority (57.2 per cent) of 
workers continued to earn SGD 20 (USD 16) or less per day. Within this sub-sample, the 
largest proportion (31.4 per cent) of workers earned a daily wage of SGD 19 to SGD 20 (USD 
14.8 to USD 16), whilst 25.8 per cent of respondents earned SGD 18 (USD 14) or less. Hence, 
it is unsurprising that workers took on average 16.5 months to fully repay their loans. In 
Mostafa's case (aged 31, Special Pass Holder), the time taken was double than what he had 
initially planned, having taken almost two years to repay his loans. This delay stemmed 
largely from the inaccurate information he received from the agent in Bangladesh who 
matched him with his current employer. As he explained:    
 
I was told that if I go [to Singapore], I would be paid this amount of money. From 
that, I have calculated how much I could save after deducting the amount I will 
be needing for my [daily use], and the amount given to my family. Also I would 
be able to pay my debts. They told me that I will get a minimum [monthly salary] 
of BDT 70,000 [SGD 1,138], but here they give me BDT 25,000 [SGD 407/ USD 
317], and meanwhile I don’t get the remaining BDT 45,000 [SGD 732/USD 571]. 
Where will this come from? (SP003-173, p.16) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Wage differentials amongst workers of different nationalities in the construction sector tend to operate 
along a racialised hierarchy where Malaysian nationals are typically hired as skilled workers, PRC Chinese 
workers as mid-skilled workers, and Indian and Bangladeshi workers as basic-skilled workers. Whilst PRC 
Chinese workers are paid a monthly average of SGD 1,200 (USD 900), Indian and Bangladeshi nationals receive 
much less at SGD 700 (USD 525) per month (The Straits Times, January 5, 2013). A survey conducted by TWC2 
revealed that the average placement fee paid by Bangladeshi workers for their first job was approximately SGD 
6,500 (USD 4,875; similar to findings from this study), whilst Indian workers paid SGD 4,500 (USD 3,375) (Loh 
2013).    
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Figure 12: Distribution of Workers’ Basic Salary per Day (n=204) 
 
When asked whether or not workers received annual salary increments from their 
employers, 20.5 per cent of respondents answered ‘always or ‘often’, 19 per cent replied 
‘sometimes’, and 57.1 per cent reported ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ (see Figure 13). Bonuses were a 
rarer occurrence: only 12 per cent of workers replied ‘always’ or ‘often’, whilst 79 per cent 
answered ‘rarely’ or ‘never’. A closer analysis of the data revealed that the type of company 
workers were employed in tended to influence their likelihood of receiving an annual salary 
increment. In particular, amongst workers who answered that they ‘always’ received annual 
salary increments, the majority (59.3 per cent) were employed in a main contracting firm. 
On the other hand, workers who reported that they ‘never’ received salary increments were 
mostly from labour supply companies (71.4 per cent).    
 
  
 
Figure 13: Salary Increment (n=205) 
 
Figure 14: Frequency of Bonus (n=205) 
 
Table 1 provides a breakdown of different types of monthly deductions that workers 
reported on. Whilst a low proportion of workers reported that deductions were made by 
their employers to cover costs for accommodation, food, transport, and/or the foreign 
worker levy, the most prevalent form of deduction was the collection of ‘savings money’ (or 
‘deposit money’), which employers deduct on the pretext of helping workers save, often 
with assurance that the monies would be returned upon completion of a worker's contract. 
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However, the retention of any portion of workers' salaries is illegal as employers are legally 
obligated to pay workers no later than seven days after the last day of their salary period. 
Local NGO TWC2 (2014) has maintained that this practice functions largely as ‘a disciplining 
tool [where] employees are made to fear that should they stand up for their rights, their 
employers may quite arbitrarily forfeit the retained sums’. Other illegal practices include 
deductions made to cover employment costs, such as the foreign workers' levy and medical 
insurance. 
 
Type of Cost Yes (%) No (%) Median Amount (SGD) 
Accommodation 12.7 85.4 40 
Transportation 1.5 95.6 100 
Food 14.1 83.9 135 
Levy 4.4 92.2 88 
Miscellaneous 19 78 78 
“Savings” Money 32.7 65.9 50 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of Monthly Deductions from Workers’ Salary (n=205) 
6.2 Job Insecurity and Workers’ Unequal Bargaining Power 
When asked whether or not they felt that they were able to negotiate their working 
conditions with their employers, many respondents cited fear of early repatriation as a main 
reason why they were hesitant to raise specific issues or concerns. Having invested a large 
sum of money (whilst incurring significant debts) to secure a job in Singapore, the thought 
of having one’s work permit cancelled prematurely seemed almost inconceivable for many. 
As Kalam explained:  
 
[If a worker] says anything, then the employer [will be] angry. He [will] say, ‘I 
send [you back to] Bangladesh [if] you talking many, many’. Then [the worker 
will] also [be] scared. He paid a lot of money [to invest in his migration stint]. If 
he says anything, and he [gets] sent back to Bangladesh, then how? (SP001-117B, 
p.2)  
 
Since the work permit scheme prescribes that workers’ visas are industry-specific and tied 
to a single employer, many migrants continued to work in less than ideal or even risky 
circumstances out of fear of being sent home before their contracts expired. Sumon 
maintained that ‘we must understand that this is not our country. We can't do a lot of things 
even if we want to. Like I said, my overtime hourly pay is SGD 3 (USD 2.3), but according to 
Singapore government law, [my employer] should pay 1.5 times [the basic rate], which they 
don't. But if I bargain, they will send me back’ (WP003-081, p.24).  
 
Even when workers chose to report these infringements to the authorities, they often face 
difficulty navigating the legal system, especially when they are not furnished with proper 
documentation such as monthly itemised payslips to make a strong claim. In Kalam's 
experience, his employer had failed to pay him the full amount of overtime wages that were 
due, seeing that he frequently clocked 24-hour shifts, which is prohibited by law. The 
company paid his basic salary through bank transfer, but chose instead to pay his overtime 
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wages in cash. In Kalam's view, this practice was a deliberate ploy to short-change workers 
of their overtime wages whilst masking illegal employment practices. One day, he decided 
to confront his employer to demand proper payment, saying ‘I shouting, [and] I say, “every 
month, my overtime [salary is] SGD 560 (USD 437), [and] you pay only SGD 160, 145 (USD 
125, 113). Why like this? Why?” […] Then he say [he will] send me back’ (SP001-171B, p.3). 
When he tried to file a formal complaint against his employer, the administrative officer 
requested for ‘proof’ to justify the alleged shortfall, to which he replied: ‘[I] cannot. 
Everything [referring to his employment contract, salary slips, and time-stamp cards] the 
company takes! Cannot give’ (SP001-171B, p.8).       
 
Job insecurity stemming from flexible hiring practices in the construction industry and 
migrants' lack of access to the labour market were other issues raised in the interviews. 
Having paid a large sum of money to secure work in Singapore, workers often plan to stay 
for at least five to ten years to accrue sufficient savings for building better livelihoods back 
home. Since work permits are issued on one or two-year contract terms with no guarantee 
of renewal, many had to rely on personal networks (e.g. friends, relatives or agents) to 
secure a continual source of employment, often with extra cost. In the case of Kamal, he 
had to return to Bangladesh after a one-year stint when his first employer failed to renew 
his contract. He managed to secure a second employer through a friend who told him that 
his company was hiring, but with the following clause: ‘To join the company, you must [pay] 
SGD 2,000 (USD 1,560) to the boss’ (WP001-056, p.8). After one year, his contract was not 
renewed again since ‘the project was over’ (p.7), and he was subsequently sent back to 
Bangladesh. There, he contacted another friend who referred him to an agent to secure 
another employer – this time paying a hefty sum of SGD 4,200 (USD 3,276). Kamal had 
attempted to find a new employer when he knew that his contract was expiring but found 
difficulty approaching employers, considering that he only had one skills certificate as a 
signalman. As he explained, ‘there are various [types of] work, like electrical and plumbing 
work, and if you know these, you can talk to the boss and get an interview or something. 
Maybe if I could approach the boss directly, then I wouldn’t have to pay so much’. (WP001-
056, p.8). 
6.3 Workplace Safety and Injuries 
It has been reported that the construction sector remains the top contributor to workplace 
fatalities in Singapore, accounting for 57 per cent of all fatalities in 2013, with most 
incidents involving falls from heights, slips, and trips (WSH Institute 2014). Amongst our 
interviews with injured workers, we found that workers' fatigue stemming from long 
working hours and tight project deadlines were key contributing factors to workplace 
accidents. In Mizan's case, he broke both wrists when he fell from a scaffolding structure 
whilst fitting a metal pipe on a flyover. He was working a daily average of 14 hours 
(including Sundays), and reckoned that the accident was largely due to fatigue stemming 
from excessive overtime work. He was also not wearing a safety harness during the time of 
the accident. Though he felt unsafe at the workplace and frequently overworked, he felt 
that he had little power to raise these issues as a new worker in the company: 
 
[My boss will say to me if] Sunday you want off, ok, [then] Saturday you also no 
[need to] come. You go back better. […] My company 'subcon' [subcontractor], 
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so main company always push, push [workers to] go faster, go faster. Then 
supervisor also push ah, [saying] 'Go fast, this one go fast. […] If the safety 
supervisor sometimes tell me must working properly, my Korean supervisor will 
talk loud[ly] to the safety supervisor, [saying] 'Why you talk to my worker? Why 
you disturb my worker?' [… My supervisor will say:] 'Koreans all hardworking, 
money also a lot. If Singapore 20 years working, Korean 5 years working enough. 
He say 'I give money, I give salary, so [you] follow me.' So [since] I first time 
coming Singapore, that's why cannot talk loud. [I am] scared to be sent home. 
You know [if] he says, no working, you go back better, [then] he send [me back 
to] Bangladesh, so [it] is [a] problem right? Yah, so two years, three years, then 
we can talk loud (SP001-163, p.28-31). 
 
Mizan’s account aligns with feedback from industry professionals stating that workplace 
accidents tend to stem largely from ‘companies rushing to meet project deadlines amidst 
rising demand for construction activities, [and] the tighter labour market contributing to 
“overstretching their workers”’ (TODAY, February 18, 2014). At the same time, scholars 
argue that the prevalence of subcontracting in the industry tends to result in a ‘diffusion of 
responsibility [that] could lead to a decline in house-keeping’ (Debrah and Ofori 1997, 699). 
In response to the recent rise in injury and fatality rates in the industry, MOM is currently 
reviewing its Demerit Points System,11  which identifies contractors with poor safety 
enforcement records and restricts their access to hiring foreign workers. At present, access 
is limited for six months if a contractor chalks up more than 18 demerit points within a year 
(TODAY, February 18, 2014). Inasmuch as the system serves to disincentivise employers 
against workplace safety infringements, injured workers may sometimes be unwittingly 
disadvantaged and penalised when employers attempt to conceal accidents at the 
workplace.  
 
In Mizan’s experience, his employer attempted to evade reporting by coaxing him to sign a 
written document that provided a false account of the accident. He was told by his 
employer: ‘You don't tell the right one… say you took the lorry, and when you tried to alight 
from it, you fell behind the lorry’ (SP001-163, p.19). Feeling afraid, he contacted his uncle 
working in Singapore to find a lawyer on his behalf and subsequently ran away from his 
employer, sharing that ‘I feel scared about Singapore's rules. I was also unsure [of whether 
or not] I [would] go [to] jail. So I [was] scared, and told my real [account of what happened 
during the] accident to the lawyer’ (SP001-163, p.21). Mizan has since filed for work injury 
compensation and was issued with a Special Pass, which legalises his stay in Singapore 
whilst he undergoes treatment and awaits his doctor’s assessment report for the Ministry to 
determine the amount of compensation he is entitled to. Since he is unable to find work as a 
Special Pass holder, he has to be reliant on his uncle’s help to pay for rent and everyday 
expenses.  
 
Depending on the nature of a workers' injury and complexity of the case, the average 
duration of the claims process can take range from three or four months to over two years. 
Mizan has been left in a state of limbo since the accident took place on January 11, 2012, 
and his parents are anxious for his return to Bangladesh. Nonetheless, he insists on awaiting 
                                                            
11 For more information on MOM's demerit points system, refer to http://www.mom.gov.sg/workplace-safety-
health/worker-workplace-surveillance/demerit-points-system/Pages/default.aspx  
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his insurance pay-out to settle outstanding loans from his initial placement fee, and use the 
remaining amount to set up a small construction business in Bangladesh. Faced with limited 
employment options stemming from permanent injury, workers often place enormous value 
on the compensation they hope to receive. In Mostafa’s words: 
 
I will build my whole life on that money. I do not know the amount but I realised 
that a huge damage has been done to my physical body. If the [sum] is large, 
then I can do something after returning to my country. I will not be able to do 
heavy work. I cannot work with the cattle or start the machine. Now, I am fully 
depending on the insurance money. How much I will get is the lottery of my life 
(SP003-173, p.6).  
 
However, the protracted process of waiting for compensation tends to take a toll on 
workers, both financially and emotionally. Kalam has been in Singapore for two and a half 
years despite having only worked for six months. As he lamented,‘ Makan (meaning: 
eating/food) also difficult, sleeping also difficult. Everything is difficult to difficult!’ (SP001-
171B, p.12) When he had no money for rent, he ended up sleeping by the roadside, or at a 
24-hour café at Mustafa Centre. He also shared that it was painful to communicate with his 
family whilst being in such dire straits, saying: ‘Sometimes I talk to [my son], and my heart is 
crying. My eyes water cannot come, but heart is crying. [… Family] only give me sympathy, 
[but I say] okay, no problem, no need this one’ (p.17).   
 
7. Remittances and Pathways of Mobility 
7.1 Weighing Individual Sacrifice and Household Well-being 
Despite the precarious nature of construction work, large numbers of Bangladeshi migrants 
continue to rely on this form of labour migration to gain socioeconomic mobility and 
increase livelihood options back home. As previously mentioned, survey results revealed 
that men's top three reasons for seeking work in Singapore were to provide for basic needs, 
accrue savings, and start a business respectively. Inasmuch as these can be planned for, 
findings on actual remittance use revealed a different pattern where debt repayment 
consisted of the largest proportion of unplanned remittance use (see Figure 15). Whilst 
spending on basic needs remained a priority (43.4 per cent), debt repayment emerged as 
the second most prominent use, increasing from a planned 2 per cent to 22.4 per cent, 
followed by spending on children's education (12.2 per cent). Meanwhile, actual remittance 
use on savings and investments in businesses decreased substantially from 15.6 per cent 
and 13.2 per cent respectively to a mere 4.4 per cent in each case. Migrants also tended to 
overestimate the amount of remittances they would be able to send home. Whilst the 
median amount forecasted was SGD 800 (USD 624) per month, the actual median figure was 
SGD 600 (USD 468) – a shortfall of 25 per cent. 
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Planned (%) Actual (%) 
Buy Land/House 5.4 9.3 
Business 13.2 4.4 
Education 9.3 12.2 
Basic Needs 47.8 43.4 
Medical 1.5 0.5 
Household goods 1 2 
Buy Vehicle 0.5 0 
Repay Debts 2 22.4 
Savings 15.6 4.4 
Other 3.9 0.5 
 
 
Figure 15: Planned and Actual Uses of Remittances (n=205) 
 
Nonetheless, when asked to describe how family life back in Bangladesh was like after they 
arrived for work in Singapore, the majority (59 per cent) of respondents answered that life 
was either ‘easier’ or ‘much easier’, particularly amongst those who have fully repaid their 
loans (see Figure 16). Workers who shared positively about their migration experience were 
often those who have stayed in Singapore for a substantial period of time. An example is 
Golam (aged 45, Work Permit Holder), who has worked in Singapore for 14 years and earns 
a monthly average of over SGD 1,200 (USD 936). He clocks 13 hours of work daily, from 
Mondays to Saturdays, and sometimes on Sundays to earn extra overtime wages. Every 
month, he remits approximately SGD 1,000 (USD 780), which is used to support a household 
of eight back home. Over the years, he has managed to provide for his children’s education, 
expand the family’s farm, and even purchased new land for a business venture where he 
plans to build a multi-storey residential complex to lease out. Despite these successes, he 
shared that it has been challenging to negotiate the demands of being the family's main 
financial provider whilst being away from home. As he explained: ‘[My family] definitely 
wants me to come back. Father, mother, all say come back. Wife and children also want me 
to come back. But I feel sometimes the money is not enough. My son is staying in Dhaka 
studying at Gazi College. The expense is a lot [and] I cannot go back now’ (WP001-008, p.14).    
 
  
  
Figure 16: Perception of Family Life after Migration (n=205)  Figure 17: Fulfilment of Plans (n=205) 
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Amongst workers who felt that life was ‘harder’ or ‘much harder’ after migration (18.6 per 
cent), one respondent explained that it was ‘because the work I am doing is very hard, but 
[the] money is not enough’ (WP001-007, p.39). These workers were also more likely to be 
those still mired in debt, and/or workers on Special Pass status with no access to regular 
income. A following question asked the extent to which workers felt that they had achieved 
what they initially set out to do after coming to Singapore. In this instance, close to half of 
respondents indicated that they achieved ‘very little’ of their migration goals or ‘not at all’. 
Stemming from this, it seems clear that whilst the majority of workers felt that migration 
had a positive impact on their family’s well-being in some way or another, a significant 
proportion still had specific plans or goals that were yet to be fulfilled. These responses align 
with the discrepancy in findings concerning migrants’ planned and actual uses of 
remittances, where plans to accumulate savings and invest in business were overtaken by 
other more immediate concerns, such as repaying debts and spending on children's 
education, along a ‘hierarchy of needs’ (Maslow 1943). Migration as a livelihood strategy is 
thus necessarily projected over the medium-term, as time is needed to build up capital for 
increasing livelihood options in the long run. Along a similar vein, when workers were asked 
to indicate the total number of years that they would ideally like to work for in Singapore 
before returning to Bangladesh, the average response was 7.3 years.    
7.2 Transient Work and Discourses of Return 
The temporal dimensions of migrant construction work are important to consider when 
assessing the outcomes of men's migration trajectories, especially in the context of 
precarious work. Inasmuch as restrictive visa regulations and flexible hiring practices in the 
industry have worked to enforce a certain measure of temporariness amongst Bangladeshi 
workers, precarity may also inadvertently prolong or perpetuate men's migration journeys 
through return. Sumon's reflection on the recurrent nature of migration amongst 
Bangladeshi migrant workers provides insight into how aspects of risk and resilience are 
often intertwined in men's decision to return. He notes:   
 
In my three and a half years of experience, I have seen most [Bangladeshi] 
people in Singapore dissatisfied with their work and money. They [either] want 
to go back, or [do] go back, but I haven't seen anyone who went back and never 
returned here again. Everybody returns here (WP003-081, p.23). 
 
Whilst Sumon's comment is indicative of strong push factors that tend to propel migrants to 
embark on circular migration as a livelihood strategy, it also points to elements of risk and 
gamble involved, especially when taking into account extra costs, such as travel and job 
placement fees, that are implicated with each migration stint. At the same time, migrants 
who have worked in Singapore for a number of years also utilise the knowledge, skills, and 
networks they have developed to increase their chances of finding a good employer. As 
Zabed explains: 
 
I will not do the hard work now as I did earlier. I am thinking of a company in 
which the returns are higher compared with the efforts I put in. Actually, 
everybody thinks this way. When anyone becomes older, then he gets familiarity 
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with different companies and different people. Some friendships develop, and 
everybody tries to come into a good company (SP003-174, p.17).  
 
Nonetheless, Zabed views his stay in Singapore as temporary, and construction work as a 
means to the longer-term end of starting a business back home to support the well-being of 
his family:  
 
[Once the] money [is] enough, then I'll go [back]. Here, it is temporary. I came 
here to earn some money, then I'll go back and start a business, and think of 
how to keep the family happy. Working in the construction sector for [the] long 
term is harmful for the body... It is not possible to work for life long. I may work 
for two, four, or ten years. When the age goes beyond 40, then it will not be 
possible (SP003-174, p.38). 
 
In this regard, the heavy demands of manual construction work imposes a limit on migrants' 
ability to remain actively employed in an industry where a particular sort of labouring body 
is demanded – one that is mobile, hyper-productive, and youthful. As Sumon notes, ‘I have 
value till I can work. But when I won't be able to work, I will have no value in Singapore’ 
(WP003-081, p.10). 
 
8. Conclusion 
The case of Bangladeshi construction workers in Singapore reveals the mutually constitutive 
nature of migration and precarity, as well as the transnational impacts of precarious work 
on migrants and their families. Even as labour shortages and fluctuations in construction 
demand have resulted in an overwhelming dependency on low-waged migrant labour in the 
industry, increased barriers to entry and the formalisation of recruitment measures have led 
to a sharp rise in the costs of migration for Bangladeshi workers in recent years. As a result, 
migrants and their families have found it necessary to undertake significant levels of debt to 
finance their migration journeys, with many taking longer than expected to fully repay these 
loans. Apart from the protracted duration at which repayment occurs, the prevalence of 
migrant indebtedness has also tended to exacerbate workers’ unequal bargaining power at 
the workplace, leaving them vulnerable to unsafe and/or exploitative working conditions. At 
the same time, stringent visa regulations, including restrictions on job mobility and access to 
social protection, measures of enforced transience, as well as the hazardous nature of 
construction work, have further compounded experiences of precariousness for migrants. In 
this regard, it is clear that precarity is multiscalar in nature, and underpinned by various 
factors including conditions of training and recruitment at source, migration policies, as well 
as workplace conditions at destination. Policy interventions aimed at reducing the costs of 
migration and workers' vulnerability in these areas are particularly important for increasing 
the development outcomes of migration for construction work.  
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